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Abstract
Political opposition to globalisation has risen in industrialized countries, although the
positive overall effects on the growth of the world economy and the alleviation of
poverty are empirically verifiable. However, the effects of globalisation vary according
to regions, professional groups, and education. In the period of intensive globalisation,
unemployment and inequality have risen, and people feel their lives to be determined by
forces they cannot influence. Since the many new challenges, such as climate protection,
can be better solved by worldwide efforts, it is indispensable to avoid new national barriers
and to strengthen the endorsement of globalisation and the concomitant welfare effects.
However, it is also necessary to respect cultural differences in preferences and to view
globalisation as a search and learning process. Instruments for the implementation of
such a strategy may vary according to regional specifics. Social and ecological goals –
gaining higher importance with rising per capita incomes – are well-represented in the
European model, but for worldwide solutions other socio-economic models will offer
preferences and solutions. Apart from the announced partial withdrawal of the United
States from globalisation and the upcoming dominance of China in world affairs and large
scale investment, Europe would be well-advised to take a greater responsibility if not the
lead in determining the rules of globalisation. Based on an opinion-forming process within
Europe, responsible globalisation can significantly improve the quality of life in Europe
and its partners worldwide.
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1 Motivation 
Globalisation is a highly relevant issue for economy and politics and it evokes strong emotions 
among the population. Empirical research shows that globalisation primarily yields advantages, 
and polls confirm that this is also the view of the majority of Europeans. But globalisation also 
may have disadvantages for regions, groups and companies. This is especially the case when 
globalisation occurs concurrently with technological breakthroughs and weak demand and when 
economic policy fails to implement the necessary stabilising measures. Then globalisation can 
entail unemployment and rising inequality. As it is often experienced by citizens as an 
exogenous force to be endured without participation and protection, it may induce nationalist 
and populist reactions and may even be met with violent resistance. These in turn affect election 
results, strengthening illiberal tendencies and the call for protectionism. 
Since important current problems such as climate change, water shortages or security issues can 
only be solved globally, Europe should remain open to globalisation, but also try to steer further 
developments according to intrinsic European values, such as liberal democracy, social balance 
and environmental sustainability. The partial withdrawal of the United States from these goals 
opens up the potential for Europe as a leader in shaping future globalisation. The current paper 
aggregates and organizes ideas for European policies that aim to achieve such broad welfare 
objectives. 
2 Empirics of the “Third Wave“ of Globalisation 
Growth, dynamics, catching-up processes 
The positive expectations with regard to the dynamics of a globalising world economy have 
been realized. During the third wave of globalisation ("hyper-globalisation" starting in the early 
1990s), the world economy grew by more than 3% per year. This output increase has been 
overwhelmingly due to the rise in labour productivity, which has in turn come about via 
technical innovations, their rapid dissemination through international economic relations, and 
the stronger global division of labour between countries with different factor endowments. 
The growth acceleration has mostly been accounted for in emerging markets, which have 
experienced an average rate of growth in their real economic output of some 5% per year. In 
industrial countries the dynamics were roughly sustained, though largely due to the expansion of 
demand in new markets. As a general observation, countries with greater openness (as measured 
by export and import shares in GDP) tend to grow faster. 
Word market shares and the geopolitical perspective 
The catching-up process of emerging countries has been mirrored in declining shares of world 
trade and production by industrial countries. This shift is the positive consequence of 
globalisation for countries with relatively low income and high levels of poverty. However, it 
also changes the rules and institutions of the globalised economy. The developed world has 
established a number of international economic organizations and has dominated their bodies 
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and expert teams. Nowadays, emerging countries require a stronger say in these organizations, 
and they charter their own regional (and sometimes global) institutions, including development 
banks. 
The EU 28 is still the biggest world economy with the highest percentage of world exports. In 
terms of value added, however, the EU is about to temporarily relinquishing its leadership to the 
United States and in the longer term to China. Growth in the Euro Area (and in the “core” 
countries Germany and France) is even weaker. This loss of economic power could be slowed 
by extending the EU towards the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region. A wider 
"European region", including Turkey, Russia and North Africa, could maintain a world market 
share of some 30%. 
Absolute poverty and relative inequality 
The long-lasting positive mood in industrial countries with respect to globalisation has been 
eroded in the face of rising worldwide imbalances and domestic inequality, as well as by the 
side-effects of immigration. A significant portion of workers in Europe and the United States 
feels threatened by globalisation, particularly if unemployment and migration coincide. To ward 
off the consequences, people are calling for protectionism and electing populist parties, while 
disregarding these parties’ socio-political concepts, which bring lower social security benefits 
and changes in the tax system that often favour the wealthy. 
Absolute poverty (as defined by a constant dollar amount per day, but also according to other 
criteria of manifest poverty) has decreased worldwide, and particularly in developing countries. 
The globalisation of knowledge in general and access to medical supplies in particular have 
substantially reduced infant mortality. The increase in life expectancy is particularly strong in 
developing countries, but even in industrial countries it is rising by two to three months each 
year. In contrast, relative inequality – the relation between top and low incomes – is on the rise 
in many countries. In Europe, unemployment has increased in recent decades, but the 
employment rate has also risen. In the United States both the unemployment rate and the 
employment rate are significantly lower today than before the financial crisis. For decades, the 
median wage has stagnated in the United States. In Europe, per-capita wages have risen, though 
those in the bottom third have done so only slightly, while the wages of people with unstable 
employment conditions have stagnated or at times even fallen. Neither the United States nor 
Europe has experienced frictionless market equilibrium in the labour market. 
Whether and to what extent the rising inequality within most countries has been related to 
globalisation is a rather controversial issue. Many studies find that the rise in personal inequality 
within countries may be chiefly attributed to technical progress and to a much lesser extent to 
globalisation. In most industrial countries it is the interaction of technology, globalisation and a 
weakening of trade unions that result in an empirically visible increase in inequality. 
Ecological development 
In the course of the third wave of globalisation, capital-intensive and energy-intensive parts of 
industrial production have shifted from advanced countries to emerging economies, where the 
emissions per output are higher and environmental requirements are lower. The corresponding 
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overall increase in emissions per unit of production (carbon leakage) has to be seen, however, 
alongside the increasing energy and resource efficiency in developed countries. It is also a fact, 
that the increase in resource efficiency has generally been lower than that of labour productivity. 
Until the 1990s, the growth of total global emissions exceeded economic growth, but it has 
since got lower and carbon dioxide emissions are now absolutely stable for three years. The 
slowdown has been furthered by efforts in China, which has achieved the highest amount of 
investment in renewable energy. The announced exit of the United States from the Paris climate 
agreement is regrettable, although up to now no country has followed suit. Other signatory 
countries and even some US states have expressed intentions to increase their decarbonisation 
efforts. For Europe this opens up the chance to widen its technological lead in energy efficiency 
and low-carbon technologies. 
Welfare assessment 
The empirical results concerning growth, employment, inequality and ecology tend to favour the 
advantages over the disadvantages of globalisation. However, they also exhibit problem areas 
and the special need for economic policy action on national, European and global levels. A 
welfare rating must be broadly based on aspects of quality of life and its dissemination, which 
are based on comprehensive indicators, including Beyond GDP Indicators, Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) and the Human Development Index. 
3 Critique and Resistance, Turn of Mind 
In the third phase of globalisation, the critique of globalisation has shifted from the exploitation 
of developing countries to the disadvantages for industrialised countries. “Unfair” competition 
from emerging economies (due to inhumane working conditions, the lack of environmental 
standards and its reinforcement through policy intervention) has been particularly lamented. 
“Secular Stagnation“ and “De-Globalisation happens“ 
Long-term forecasts of GPD growth in industrialized countries yield rates of just 1-2% per year. 
The "Secular Stagnation Hypothesis" provides supply-side and demand-side causes for subdued 
growth in the future (Summers, 2016; Gordon, 2015). In recent years, world trade has increased 
less than global production. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or the beginning of a de-
globalisation phase remains open. 
Turnaround in the political discussion and criticism of international agreements 
In a number of European countries, newly-created "our country first" movements have had 
some success in parliamentary elections, at least until the spring of 2017. International trade 
agreements have collapsed at the multinational level (Doha round) and have been fiercely 
criticized at the national level (TIP, CETA, TTIP; ASIA, MERCOSUR). In the United States, 
the NAFTA agreement is hardly defended by the general public and China's admission to the 
WTO is considered a mistake. 
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Causes of the turnaround 
Increasing inequality and high unemployment can be identified as the two central causes for 
sceptical assessments of globalisation and the call for protectionism and re-nationalisation.  
Today the income and wealth distribution within most countries is more unequal than in 1990. 
From a global perspective, while low incomes in catching-up countries have risen substantially, 
incomes in the highest brackets have boomed as result of technological advances, "winner takes 
all” principles and a lack of government intervention. The "global middle class”, comprising the 
working class in industrialized countries, has benefited least from globalisation (Milanovic, 
2016). Most analyses emphasize that the effect of technology on the difference of income 
distribution is stronger than the influence of globalisation. As mentioned above, the problems 
may actually reinforce each other. 
Unemployment is concentrated regionally and sectorally, mostly in former manufacturing areas 
with heavy industry, but also in regions with simple processing and delivery capacities and 
intermediate qualifications. For low-skilled people, an oversupply prevails despite extreme 
wage restraint and declining real wages in the long run. In contrast, skilled workers are in short 
supply, especially in technical professions. For highly qualified persons, competition is rather 
intense and headhunting and the outbidding of management salaries are commonplace.  
Amplification through policy failures 
First, economic policy has responded poorly to the disadvantages of globalisation which were 
well predicted on a theoretical level: In particular, globalisation losers – for example low skilled 
workers in high income countries – have not been compensated or re-qualified early enough. 
Second, the financial crisis has resulted in a lasting distrust in the financial sector. Also the new 
regulations after the financial crisis have not stopped criticism, as they have not resolved a 
number of central failures. The presence of high-frequency trade, extremely high management 
salaries, the concentration of power, and profit transfers through tax havens has not been 
significantly diminished. 
Third, the negative consequences of globalisation are more visible than the positive ones, 
because national policy and governments, but also private managers and companies tend to 
ascribe successes to their own merits, while failures are attributed to external forces. 
Migration can have positive effects in the target country, if it matches the demand for labour, as 
well as in the country of origin, if it limits the brain drain by circular migration (Kanduth, 2017). 
However, if the negative effects dominate (resulting from war, famine or an excess of low-
skilled persons in the target country), they are often exploited by populist movements in a 
distortive way. Economic fears may then be aggravated by fears of loss of cultural identity. 
4 Principles and Instruments of Responsible Globalisation 
Reshaping globalisation is the only chance to continue this welfare-increasing process and at the 
same time mitigate and prevent radical populist opposition. This will be no easy task, given the 
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current rules of international trade and investment agreements, as well as the implicit dominance 
of the US in international organizations and political pressure from frequently US-dominated, 
multinational firms. The heterogeneity of partners and cultural differences are increasing. Weak 
governance and national agendas as well as lobbying groups prevent strategic reforms. The 
global economy is multipolar and political conflicts – often within countries – are increasing. 
Therefore we divide our strategy into principles and instruments. Basic principles are essential 
and will be easier to agree upon, but less easy to make operable instruments, which are 
necessary to change the game, but reflect a search process; and countries can and will take a 
very different mix of them. 
Principles of responsible globalisation under a European lead 
Principle 1: Globalisation is no final goal, but a means of promoting well-being, increasing 
choices, dissipating technologies and promoting peace and has to be assessed according to 
these objectives. 
Whether globalisation has to be welcomed and its speed is too fast or too slow should be 
assessed in relation to the goals of society, using a cost benefit analysis. There will be on 
average more gains than losses, but the balance will be varying according to these goals, for 
groups and skill level, as well as regional disruptions and imbalances occur. 
Principle 2: Globalisation increases the set of choices for individuals and countries, and all the 
more if it encourages bottom-up elements, allowing for differences in preferences and mutual 
learning. 
With rising incomes, preferences become more heterogeneous and the freedom to determine 
one’s occupation, place of work, work-life balance and lifestyle becomes ever more important 
for welfare. The ability to make these choices depends on the capabilities provided by the 
educational system. Countries will choose different strategies depending on the starting 
situation, some trying to catch up with richer economies, others going for a leading technology 
position or greater inclusiveness. The need for economic policy to accompany globalisation is 
well-established.  
Principle 3: Globalisation is fuelled by market forces and new technologies; and whether 
social, ecological and efficiency goals are attained depends on the accompanying policy.  
Even in closed economies economic policy has to correct market failures, internalize external 
costs and benefits and provide public goods and risk protection. These necessities change, but 
do not dissolve under globalisation. The same holds for the necessity of a simultaneous strategy 
for social, economic and ecological goals. If welfare is to be generated by a separate strategy for 
each of its components and increasing the benefits of globalisation still another, economic 
policy will be expensive and inefficient and the size of government and debt will further 
increase. 
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Principle 4: The speed and burden of change accelerates in open countries and losers therefore 
have to be compensated, less skilled people be enabled to switch from the losing to the winning 
position. 
In the long run, the education and retraining system has to provide the capabilities to cope with 
changes in occupation, jobs, qualifications and the increased mobility demanded and supplied 
by globalisation. Investing in education, retraining, the creation of new firms and innovations is 
better suited to more heterogeneous preferences and problems. It is in the joint interest of all 
society members, and should therefore be a shared responsibility and obligation. 
Principle 5: The functions which provide quality of life (lodging, nutrition, travelling, 
communication, attractive environment) have to be defined and progress under globalisation 
must be continuously monitored. 
Life quality and well-being is a better and more comprehensive measure of economic 
performance than economic output and the growth of GDP. To make the measurement 
operational, the functions which constitute quality of life, even if somewhat different, have to be 
specified accordingly. Examples for doing so are given in the Better Life Indicators by the 
OECD or the Sustainability Development Goals by UN and EU (capabilities or functionality 
approach). This does not mean that the elements and their relative importance may not be 
different across cultures, but that societies have to define them and international agreements 
should respect the differences and not provide instruments to fight them in courts. 
Principle 6: Europe should try to shape globalisation more actively according to its values than 
it has done in the past, thus filling the gap opened by the retreat of the US; however, it should 
also learn from other cultures.  
In the past, Europe has profited from its openness and the speed of globalisation, and currently 
enjoys a positive balance of external accounts (in contrast to the US). However, it has not 
shaped the rules of globalisation, and many international trade and investment rules afford no 
priority to social and ecological standards, liberal democracies and the fight against corruption. 
Since these “European values” typically increase in importance in richer economies, it makes 
sense to call for upgrading standards instead of supporting a race to the bottom. With increasing 
incomes, for all countries competiveness depends on a high-road strategy if welfare is to be 
enhanced. Climbing up the quality ladder – independently of the current position – increases life 
chances and the positive contribution of globalisation for choices and peace. This does not mean 
that goals and values have to become identical, since plurality and heterogeneity provide 
economic and societal advantages, as does learning from others.  
Principle 7: Looking for jointly advantageous solutions increases well-being and economic 
success, and shaping rules with “my country first” slogans will fail in the long run. 
Contracts are feasible for individuals, firms and nations if both partners have an advantage. 
Division of labour by open borders on a level playing field and providing capabilities for change 
is positive for all societies. The past international agreements and the agenda of international 
organizations were built on the principle of mutual advantage and as win-win contracts for all 
members. Securing social rights and the Paris agreement work in the same direction. The 
populist request for a strict renationalization of policy or the assertion that contracts should only 
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be obeyed or agreed if one partner wins at the cost of the other (or at least definitely gets more 
than the other – often the partner with the lower per capita income) will not lead to contracts, 
not internalize external costs and not provide global public benefits. And benefits will not be 
generated – neither in the short run, nor in the long run.  
Potential game changers 
Potential game changing instruments will support the attainment of the strategic goals, but also 
raise stronger opposition. Such instruments were up to now neither easy to implement nor 
undisputed in light of the less homogenous EU and euro area. On the other hand, not all 
instruments have to be applied at the same time and within the same intensity. Trial and error 
and national preferences on the choice of the instruments as well as their mix are not only 
possible but also efficient, given that the reshaping of globalisation is a search process in 
unknown territory and no one knows the best solution. 
1. New performance benchmark: The performance of an economy or region should switch from 
GDP to "Beyond GDP Goals" and "Social Development Goals". 
Economic dynamics remain important in solving problems such as unemployment, inequality 
and public debt, as well as giving migrants a chance to work and to get integrated. Broader 
indicators on performance of Europe are necessary if globalisation and enthusiasm for the 
European project are to be reconciled. People wish to have choices to determine their own lives; 
economic policy has to provide the resources and capabilities required for this purpose.  
2. Problem solving by empowerment: Common European or global solutions should not be 
bureaucratic and detailed, but provide a framework for better national or regional solution.  
The rules and benefits of globalisation must be shaped as a way to solve global challenges. The 
policy rules should enable countries to choose problems and preference-orientated solutions. 
Transparency and the closing of tax shelters, as well as common definitions for the tax base, 
allow countries to choose the rates and structure of taxes needed for increasing welfare, instead 
of taxing labour and leaving inheritances untaxed for reasons of tax evasion or tax shifting. 
3. Reduction of unemployment and inequality: Raising the net wages of less-skilled workers 
through a reduction of the social security contribution or through work benefits or training 
increases employment at the same time as it decreases income disparity. 
The social system should not be primarily financed by taxing labour, but by taxing activities that 
decrease welfare, such as emissions, or that prevent the equality of chances, such as large 
inheritances. This offers a win-win-win situation, increasing employment, reducing inequity and 
cutting the future costs of climate change. 
4. Switching from protection to social investment: The focus of social policy should switch from 
ex-post protection, after jobs have been lost and firms have exited, to investing in future 
capabilities, starting with early education. 
Social costs are already high in Europe, amounting to 40 % of government expenditures, and 
new challenges call for a higher burden. Investing in education, retraining and offering 
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capabilities for problem-solving and change increases choices and lowers the probability of not 
finding a new and better job, if the old one is lost due to structural change and globalisation. 
5. Refocusing public expenditures: Investment in education and innovation is increasing 
dynamics and employment in industrialized countries. 
Administrative expenditures and over-detailed regulation are detrimental to output, private 
employment and international competitiveness. Europe has an investment deficit and financing 
debt is rather cheap today, but this should not be used to invest in highway and construction 
projects, but rather in human capacities and increasing welfare. In general, a switch from 
tangible to intangible investment is needed, with tangible investment focusing on technologies 
for broadband and decarbonisation. 
6. Redirecting innovation: Technological progress should be shifted from primarily saving 
labour to focusing much more on saving energy and resources. 
Labour productivity is currently increasing much faster than energy and resource productivity. 
This supports the growth imperative (the rate of growth under which unemployment rises) as 
well as the future cost of repairing ecological damages and limiting climate change. The current 
trend is not determined by technological forces, but by the fact that labour is heavily taxed, 
emissions are not taxed and fossil energy is subsidized. A responsible globalisation strategy 
should support the change in economic policy as well as the technological trend. 
7. Internalizing the costs of emissions: The future costs of current emissions and polluting 
activities have to be included in the cost calculation. 
Bringing future costs into firm calculations is a complementary policy to environmental 
regulation. International trade and investment activities should press for internalizing external 
costs or setting more ambitious standards. This will not be equal between emerging and 
industrial countries, but both could upgrade the ambitions of climbing up the ecological quality 
ladder. 
8. Symmetrical flexibility for firms and employees: Flexibility of working hours according to 
demand fluctuations increases the output of firms; in compensation, workers should be able to 
shift working time according to work lifecycle demands. 
Firms in open and globalised economies need flexibility to adapt production to international 
demand fluctuations and are reluctant to pay overtime. On the other hand, workers want to work 
more in some stages of their lives, whereas in other phases, they long for leisure and ability to 
fulfil family duties. This demand could be traded and could include a general trend of reducing 
working time if desired by some groups. If these deals are symmetrical, they increase the 
competiveness of firm as well as welfare. 
9. Coordination of international organisations: Several international organisations are shaping 
economic, social and environmental rules, and closer cooperation with each other would be 
essential. 
The IMF, WTO, UNCTAD, ILO, World Bank and IAO, to name just a few of the important 
organizations, have shaped globalisation. They never agreed on common priorities and no one 
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has analysed whether their rules and recommendations are compatible or one activity is 
hampering another. They should try to set a common agenda for a responsible globalisation 
linked to social goals. The agenda should be discussed with national governments and with non-
governmental organizations. This is no easy task, but a conference prepared and inspired by the 
Paris summit of 2015 could be an example of how to do this. A common agenda by as many 
international conferences as possible would also require and enable intra-European commitment 
to a program of responsible globalisation.  
10. Redesigning trade agreements: The goal of new agreements should be to increase 
well-being while respecting cultural differences, and in general social, environmental and 
health standard should be upgraded. 
Current agreements are not linked to social goals. This may make it easier to write the 
agreements, but the consent of citizens is lost. If standards are lowered under the heading of the 
dominant goal of competing by price, a race to the bottom cannot be excluded. 
11. Democratic control for trade courts: Timely decisions on trade and investment disputes are 
needed, but the decisions should be integrated into in the hierarchy of the courts with the 
potential of recourses.  
The opposition to open markets comes from different angles. In emerging countries as well as in 
transition economies, it comes from domestic incumbents who are often intertwined with the 
ruling class and family elites. But on the other hand multinational companies often experience 
legal conflict and employ an armada of experts to influence the level-playing field in favour of 
large firms. The interests of a third sector of small and medium-sized firms, and an endogenous 
industry specialized in small-scale innovation, suffer. Courts must respect these different 
aspects and the interest of small, emerging local firms and local technologies has to be defined 
ex ante (infant industry argument), in addition to being respected by the courts. A European 
fund supporting European SME interests and international organisations which helps to define 
infant industry and regional technology interests is essential for responsible globalisation, 
paving the way for fast procedures without being dominated by unaccountable special courts. 
12. Ecological responsibility for multinationals: The act of polluting regions and committing 
irreversible damage should be just as intolerable as using child labour and production methods 
that lead to illness and death in the social sphere. 
To some extent it is inevitable that the technology used in emerging and developed countries 
differ with respect to energy efficiency, emissions and pollution. But these differences have a 
negative effect on the world climate and local environment (see the carbon leakage arguments). 
Similarly to the minimum standards in the social sphere, which have been continuously 
upgraded, rules should be established for environmental technologies. One driver for limiting 
differences in technology would be the mandatory reporting of emissions relative to output in 
the different plants of a multinational firm. Then investors as well as host countries, and perhaps 
also the media and international organisations, could increase the pressure to use best 
technology in countries whose rules do not demand this. 
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13. European Neighbourhood Investment Program (ENP): European neighbours have a 
potentially high growth rate and this potential could be made effective if Europe invests more in 
the neighbourhoods, thus also limiting political conflict and the necessity to migrate. 
After World War II the US demonstrated that investing in a region with past political conflict 
can at the same time create a market and a political partner. European investment in the Black 
Sea area, in the Arabic countries and in North Africa may unleash growth and reduce conflicts. 
Free trade zones under US guarantee may be a possibility if local governments do not exist and 
cannot guarantee stability. Different international organisations might provide guarantees, while 
individual European countries can try different models. 
14. Knowledge transfer and intercultural learning: Cultural differences can be mitigated and 
learning accelerated through an exchange of researchers and qualified workers. 
The US Fulbright program offers an example of how European researchers can get the 
opportunity to study at leading universities. This leads to a common understanding of values 
and systems. In Europe, an Erasmus ‘plus’ program could be the start, based on which the elite 
of the neighbours is invited. This program should be extended to industrial and skilled workers, 
who are either trained in the neighbourhood or in Europe's system of dual education. 
15. Reaping the benefits of migration: The mutually positive effects of migration are less evident 
if migration is caused by problems in the country of origin; and specific support to integrate 
migrants into work early is necessary. 
Education and skill improvement increase the probability of work in the host country, circular 
migration – return of migrants after some time – benefit the country of destination and stabilize 
trade and investment relation between both. 
16. Recommitting finances to social needs: Negative spillovers from the financial system have to 
be stopped by fewer but smarter regulations, and the goals of all investment funds should be 
known to investors and regulators. 
Incentives for the financial sectors to effectively strengthen the real economy should be set. 
Investors should be motivated and enabled to include the needs of society into particular 
portfolio selection. Labelling funds according to their contribution to social and ecological goals 
and responsible globalisation could help investors selecting their portfolio. 
5 Resume 
Following these principles and searching for the best instruments to implement them will 
hopefully make the welfare effect of globalisation increase for all partners. Europe should try to 
increase its impact on shaping the rule, but at the same time learning from its partners. 
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